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REMARKS
LESSONS FROM THE BARINGS COLLAPSE*
SHEILA C. BAIR**
INTRODUCrION
T J7HE February 1995 collapse of Barings PLC ("Barings") has, in
X many respects, produced far more questions than answers. This
afternoon, I would like to explore some of those questions and such
answers as we have to date. Perhaps the most frequent questions, es-
pecially among the general public, are "What caused the Barings col-
lapse?" and "Could something similar happen in the United States?"
I will try to answer both those questions in due course. First, however,
given the fact that most of Barings' losses occurred through futures
trading (albeit on overseas markets), it might be helpful to begin with
some background about futures markets generally and how they
function.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE FUTURES MARKETS
The traditional futures contract is simply a standardized agreement
between a buyer and seller that requires the seller, called the short, to
deliver to the buyer, called the long, a particular commodity at a fu-
ture date, for a price agreed upon at the contract's inception.' Though
many futures contracts require physical delivery of the underlying
commodity, they are typically offset prior to delivery with the parties
paying (or receiving) a cash amount equal to the difference between
the initial contract price and the contract's value on the date their
obligations are extinguished.' Many people still think of futures con-
tracts in terms of agricultural commodities. In point of fact, however,
the overwhelming majority of futures trading, both in the United
States and internationally, involves financial instruments such as stock
indices, government bonds, and foreign currencies.
* These Remarks are adapted from a speech presented on April 20, 1995, in
connection with the 1994-1995 Fordham University Graduate Colloquium: Financial
Services Regulation at Mid-Decade.
** Sheila C. Bair is Senior Vice President, Government Relations for the New
York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE"). She was a member of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (the "CFTC") from June 1991 to June 1995. The views ex-
pressed in these Remarks are the author's and are not necessarily those of the CFTC
or the NYSE.
1. See Chicago Board of Trade, Commodity Trading Manual 8 (Lloyd Besant ed.,
5th ed. 1982).
2. 1 Philip M. Johnson & Thomas L Hazen, Commodities Regulation § 1.04 (2d
ed. 1989).
3. See 1994 CFTC Ann. Rep. 99.
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Futures contracts are highly leveraged instruments. Typically, the
amount of performance bond or "margin" required to establish and
maintain a futures position is less than five percent of the contract's
notional value.4 As a consequence, it is possible to make a great deal
of money, or lose a great deal of money, very quickly on a relatively
minimal initial investment. Leverage is not generally a problem for
traders using futures for hedging purposes. Perfect hedges are risk
neutral.' Losses on the futures position will be offset by gains on the
underlying cash position being hedged, and vice versa.6 Leverage can,
however, pose significant dangers for speculators who intentionally as-
sume risk in the hopes of profiting from future price movements.
Generally, futures trading, both in the United States and abroad,
takes place on regulated exchange markets and is subject to some de-
gree of governmental oversight.7 In addition, futures transactions
both here and overseas are supported by a clearinghouse guarantee.8
A clearinghouse is the facility through which trades and the resulting
financial obligations are settled.' The clearinghouse acts as the buyer
to each seller and the seller to each buyer'°-the universal
counterparty guaranteeing performance for each transaction.
For traders on an exchange, the financial soundness of the clearing-
house is obviously of paramount importance. For this reason, both
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the "CFTC" or the
"Commission") and the exchanges the CFTC regulates take care to
ensure that U.S. clearinghouses and their member firms are well capi-
talized and that accounts are adequately margined." In the United
States, all futures positions are "marked to the market" each day; that
is, buyers and sellers must make daily settlements of all changes in
contract value. 12 To date, the U.S. futures clearing system has been
4. This figure represents a rough approximation of the margin required by most
exchanges on most futures contracts.
5. See Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, § 1.12, at 51-52.
6. Id.
7. Until the passage of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), futures contracts in
the United States were, with very few exceptions, required to be traded on a contract
market designated by the CFTC to be legal. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988), amended by Fu-
tures Trading Practices Act § 502. The Futures Trading Practices Act empowered the
CFTC to grant exemptions from the exchange trading requirement. Futures Trading
Practices Act § 502 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994)).
8. Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, § 2.50; see CFTC, International Regulation of
Derivatives Markets, Products and Intermediaries 529 (1995) (reporting that numer-
ous overseas regulatory agencies have rules pertaining to the scope, nature, and tim-
ing of clearinghouse guarantees).
9. Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, § 1.31.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Mark J. Powers & David J. Vogel, Inside the Financial Futures Markets 26-27
(2d ed. 1984).
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extremely successful. No customer has ever lost money due to an ex-
change member default.' 3
1H. Tr BARINGS COLLAPSE: WHAT HAPPENED?
While details of some of the events surrounding the collapse of Bar-
ings remain hazy, the essential facts, according to published reports,
appear to be the following. Keep in mind, however, that investiga-
tions by the Bank of England, the relevant exchanges, and the crimi-
nal authorities in Singapore and England are continuing. In late 1994,
Nicholas Leeson, Barings' twenty-seven year old head arbitrage trader
in Singapore,' 4 began to implement an options trading strategy pre-
mised on the assumption that the Nikkei 225, an index of leading Jap-
anese stocks, would remain in a narrow trading range.' 5 His trading
strategy went awry shortly after the January seventeenth Kobe earth-
quake. 6 The Nikkei fell substantially and large losses began to accrue
on his position.' 7
In late January of this year, in an apparent attempt to cover these
large losses, Leeson abandoned his arbitrage strategy of buying fu-
tures contracts on one exchange and selling the same number at a
slightly higher price on another exchange.' 8 Instead, he started buy-
ing Nikkei 225 futures on both the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange, or SIMEX, and the Osaka Securities Exchange. 19 This po-
sition would turn a profit if Japanese stock prices rose.20 Leeson even-
tually built up futures positions on the two exchanges with a total
notional value of over $7 billion.21 At about the same time, Leeson
started selling futures on long- and short-term Japanese government
debt.2 Because interest rates move inversely to the price of debt is-
sues, the positions would profit if Japanese interest rates rose. These
positions eventually grew to a notional value of $22 billion.23
Unfortunately for Leeson and Barings, both the Japanese stock
market and Japanese interest rates fell, and all of Leeson's positions
began to experience large losses.24 Between late January and late
February, Barings met margin calls1s that totaled over $400 mil-
13. Andrea M. Corcoran, Bankruptcy Pitfalls for Dually-Licensed Brokerage
Firms, 12 Futures Int'l L. Letter 1 (Jan. 1993).
14. Leeson turned 28 on February 25, 1995. See Richard W. Stevenson, Big Gam-
bles, Lost Bets Sank a Venerable Firm, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3. 1995, at Al.
15. Id. at D15.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Tony Shale, Why Barings Was Doomed, Euromoney, Mar. 1995, at 40.
22. See Stevenson, supra note 14, at D15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
1995]
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lion.26 On February twenty-third, Leeson left Singapore.27 The next
day, Peter Baring, the chairman of Barings, was informed of the situa-
tion.28 At that point, the open positions established by Leeson had
unrealized losses of nearly $1 billion.2 9
Barings informed the Bank of England of the situation on that same
day.30 Over the ensuing weekend, the Bank of England tried to for-
mulate a rescue package for Barings .3  This proved impossible be-
cause Barings' futures positions remained open, and thus the full
extent of the losses on these positions was unknown.32 On Sunday,
February twenty-sixth, Barings was placed into administration, the
British equivalent of bankruptcy.3 3 Soon thereafter, Barings' proprie-
tary positions on SIMEX, the Osaka Securities Exchange, the Tokyo
International Financial Futures Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change were liquidated.3 Though the liquidation was orderly, total
losses on the positions approximated $1.4 billion. In early March,
ING, a Dutch bank and insurance firm, 3 6 purchased Barings' entire
business for one British pound.3 7
III. WHAT CAUSED THE BARINGS COLLAPSE?
In sum, over a period of approximately two months, futures and
options trading by a single trader in the Singapore office of Barings
triggered the collapse of a financial institution that had endured for
233 years. What was the underlying cause of this disaster? There is
no doubt in my mind concerning the answer to that question: a
profound and fundamental breakdown of Barings' internal controls.
According to published reports, Leeson was allowed to oversee both
the trading activities of the Singapore office and its "back office sys-
tems"-those systems which provide for the settlement and account-
ing of transactions.3 8 In other words, there apparently was no
independent Barings official looking over Leeson's shoulder to review
26. See Frances Maguire, Can You Manage It?, Futures & Options World, Apr.
1995, at 25.
27. See Stevenson, supra note 14, at D15.
28. Id. at Al.
29. See id.
30. See Ginger Szala et al., Barings Abyss, Futures, May 1995, at 68.
31. Richard S. Grossman, Barings' Failure, Then and Now, J. Com., Mar. 27, 1995,
at 9A.
32. Id.
33. Stevenson, supra note 14, at Al.
34. Jane Blennerhassett, Barings' Singapore Losses Remain Mystery, Reuters, Feb.
28, 1995, available in W'ESTLAW, REUTERNEWS Database; Velisarios Kattoulas,
Barings' Japan Positions Squared, But Worries Linger, Reuters, Mar. 2, 1995, available
in WESTLAW, REUTERNEWS Database; see Shale, supra note 21, at 40.
35. Shale, supra note 21, at 40.
36. Peter Truell, Sale of Baring Assets to ING Group is Likely, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 3,
1995, at D15.
37. Shale, supra note 21, at 40.
38. Maguire, supra note 26, at 25.
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and verify his transactions and ensure that his trading activity was
kept within acceptable levels of risk.
In my view, any firm engaged in significant derivatives trading
should have risk management systems which are kept separate and
distinct from its trading functions and which have independent lines of
reporting authority reaching to the highest levels of senior manage-
ment. Virtually every study of derivatives markets over the past few
years has emphasized the basic need for firms to separate risk man-
agement from trading functions. 39 Because I am speaking to a group
of practicing lawyers and lawyers-to-be, let me add that if I were ad-
vising a client on the single most important step it should take in the
aftermath of the Barings collapse, it would be for the client to reevalu-
ate its internal controls to ensure that this basic principle is being fol-
lowed. Moreover, if I were counseling an end-user of derivatives
products, I would strongly advise against doing business with any fi-
nancial intermediary that does not follow this simple rule.
IV. COULD IT HAPPEN HERE?
The question of what caused the Barings collapse is much easier to
answer than the question of whether it could happen here. I wish I
could say that all major U.S. banks and financial firms adhere to the
highest standards of internal controls and risk management. I believe
(and hope!) that they do, but obviously there are no guarantees.
What the United States does have, however, is a sophisticated set of
safeguards designed to give the CFTC and its self-regulatory organiza-
tions some advance warning when a firm's futures trading may be get-
ting it into trouble. Had the Barings scenario started to play out in the
U.S. marketplace, I believe these safeguards would have been trig-
gered well before the situation reached the disastrous proportions it
actually assumed overseas.
In a situation involving unusually large positions, such as those Bar-
ings accumulated, the CFTC's first line of defense would be its market
surveillance system.' The CFTC and all U.S. futures exchanges
maintain large trader reporting systems. If a trader's position exceeds
a "reportable level," it must file certain information about itself with
the CFTC.4' The reporting thresholds for each contract are set fairly
low in relation to volume and open interest in the contract.42 For in-
39. See, eg., Commodity Futures Trading Commission, OTC Derivatives Markets
and Their Regulation 134 (1993) (noting the need for such a separation); Global De-
rivatives Study Group, Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Practices and Principles 12-13,
15-16 (1993) (same); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Financial Derivatives: Actions
Needed to Protect the Financial System 56 (1994) (same).
40. 2 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, § 3.118.
41. 17 C.F.R. § 18.04 (1995).
42. See id. § 15.03.
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stance, the threshold for the U.S. futures contract on the Nikkei 225
Index is fifty contracts.43
When a trader's position becomes reportable, the trader must pro-
vide the CFTC with the name and phone number of the person who
controls trading in the account and the identity of any other accounts
controlled by that person.44 Futures commission merchants, or FCMs,
are also required to file daily reports about all accounts they carry
which exceed reportable levels.45 These can be cross-checked against
the reports filed by the individual traders. Accounts under common
ownership or control are aggregated for reporting purposes, meaning
that a trader cannot avoid the CFTC's reporting requirements by con-
trolling a number of small accounts below the reporting threshold. 6
Large trader information is filed electronically. 7 Information re-
flecting positions of traders as of the market close on Monday is avail-
able on Tuesday morning to the CFTC surveillance economist
responsible for monitoring a given contract. Large, unusual, or con-
centrated positions on one side of the market, or distortions between
cash and futures positions, are carefully scrutinized. The CFTC sur-
veillance staff briefs the Commission weekly on any unusual market
conditions. There is no question in my mind that a Barings-type trad-
ing pattern developing in the U.S. marketplace would have quickly set
off alarm bells, triggering a thorough follow-up by our surveillance
staff and a prompt report to the Commission.
In addition to looking at unusual positions or market conditions,
U.S. market surveillance systems also monitor for compliance with
speculative position limits.48 For example, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange's (the "CME") speculative limit for the Nikkei 225 is 5,000
contracts. 49 Any exemptions from the limits (for hedge positions, for
instance) must be thoroughly documented." Again, in the U.S. mar-
ketplace, the Barings positions undoubtedly would have triggered a
review for exceeding speculative limits. Similarly, a review of the evi-
dence submitted to obtain a hedge exemption would have occurred,
including a review of any related cash market position. In this connec-
tion, the extensive information sharing arrangements among the
CFTC, U.S. futures markets, and the CFTC's securities counterparts
would enable the CFTC to verify independently whether a trader is
holding positions in the securities markets that might offset large stock
index futures positions.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 18.04.
45. Id. § 17.00.
46. Id. § 18.01.
47. See id. § 17.02.
48. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1994); Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, § 2.20.
49. Chicago Mercantile Exchange Rule 4402(D) (1994).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 19.00(b)(1) (1995).
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In addition to conducting market surveillance, both the CFTC and
the exchanges closely monitor for compliance with financial integrity
rules. Exchange financial surveillance systems routinely produce "ex-
ception reports." These reports provide information about firms
which are carrying positions that are large relative to the market, or
that sustain a series of losses over time, or that have the potential to
generate large losses relative to the amount of margin the firm has on
deposit or the firm's capital. The exchanges also are required to do
stress testing to monitor the vulnerability of their clearing members
during times of market volatility.
Furthermore, U.S. futures exchanges maintain a joint information
system that shares daily pay and collect information.5 1 By sharing
such information, they can obtain a better view of their clearing firms'
activities across all futures and option markets.
Finally, U.S. exchanges have affirmative duties to supervise their
markets as a matter of law, and they take those duties very seriously.52
So does the CFTC. The agency conducts regular rule enforcement
reviews of exchange self-regulatory programs and issues public "re-
port cards" grading the exchanges' performance.5 3
I believe the system I have just described would make it very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the Barings crisis to have taken place in
U.S. financial markets, particularly given the fact that Barings accu-
mulated its ill-fated positions over nearly two months. As the firm's
market position and its risk exposure built up, Barings undoubtedly
would have drawn the attention of CFTC and exchange market sur-
veillance experts. Moreover, Barings would have stumbled over any
number of trip wires, in both CFTC and exchange systems, designed
to protect the financial integrity of the U.S. marketplace.
V. THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE BARINGS CRISIS
Let me turn now to the U.S. response to the Barings crisis. The
CFTC first learned that Barings was on the verge of bankruptcy on
Saturday, February twenty-fifth. Chairman Schapiro immediately as-
sembled a "swat team" of senior staff members to determine the im-
pact a Barings bankruptcy or default might have on U.S. firms and
exchanges, as well as any potential systemic problems.'
Of preeminent concern was the danger of systemic risk resulting
from Barings going into administration. All of Barings' accounts were
51. See Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks at the 20th Annual National Futures Industry
Conference 6 (Mar. 16, 1995) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
52. Under CFTC regulations, every contract market is required to use "due dili-
gence" to maintain a "continuing affirmative action program" to secure compliance
with the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994), the CFTC's regulations
and the exchange's rules. 17 C.F.R. § 1.51 (1995).
53. See 7 U.S.C. § 12e (1994).
54. Schapiro, supra note 51, at 2.
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frozen, including those representing approximately $350 million of
U.S. firms' customer money.55 In addition, SIMEX was dramatically
increasing margin requirements, anticipating that there would be mar-
ket volatility resulting from Barings liquidating its positions. 6 U.S.
firms, however, were reluctant to post additional margin without some
assurance from SIMEX that margin payments would not be used to
make up for potential shortfalls in Barings' proprietary positions. 7
By 3:00 a.m. Singapore time on Tuesday, February twenty-eighth,
Chairman Schapiro was able to obtain written assurance from the
Monetary Authority of Singapore that customer funds would not be
used to cover Barings' losses 5 8 This assurance gave U.S. firms suffi-
cient confidence to post additional margin, thus avoiding a potentially
calamitous situation.
With that immediate problem resolved, the most difficult challenge
the Commission encountered involved transferring U.S. firms' cus-
tomer accounts out of Barings and into another clearing firm. Be-
cause these accounts had been frozen, these firms were trapped. They
were vulnerable to adverse market moves, yet unable to trade out of
their positions. In the words of Chairman Schapiro, "For five days,
virtually eighteen hours a day, we talked, cajoled, and pressured for-
eign exchanges and regulators to transfer positions from various Bar-
ings accounts. '59
The process was complicated significantly by the fact that, while the
Japanese regulatory structure in general requires separate accounting
for customer and proprietary positions,6 ° it does not require the actual
segregation of customer funds at the exchange.6 ' In the United States,
customer funds and positions must be clearly identified as belonging
to customers and segregated from the funds and proprietary positions
of the carrying FCM.62 On the Japanese exchanges, however, margin
funds posted by Barings on its own positions were commingled with
customer margin.63
Ultimately, all customer funds were identified and transferred. Re-
lying on extensive experience in transferring customer positions out of
troubled firms in U.S. markets, the CFTC contributed significantly to
resolving the problem. In effect, new systems were put together, ad
55. William Falloon, Who's Missing From the Picture?, Risk, Apr. 1995, at 20.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see Schapiro, supra note 51, at 3.
58. See Szala et al., supra note 30, at 68-69.
59. Schapiro, supra note 51, at 4.
60. CFTC, International Regulation of Derivative Markets, Products and Finan-
cial Intermediaries 530 (1995) (reporting that the Japanese Ministry of Finance re-
quires financial intermediaries to keep records regarding customer funds).
61. See Szala et al., supra note 30, at 73.
62. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1994).
63. See Szala et al., supra note 30, at 73.
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hoc, to implement position transfers at exchanges that otherwise had
no rules covering such a situation."
VI. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE BARINGS CRISIS
Fortunately, the global marketplace weathered the Barings storm.
There were some bumps along the way, but exchange risk control and
clearing mechanisms worked, as did the lines of communication that
have grown among regulators and exchanges around the world. Nev-
ertheless, every episode of extreme stress reveals weaknesses in the
system and areas where improvements can be made. The Barings cri-
sis is no exception.
The CFTC has adopted a twofold approach. First, in an independ-
ent initiative announced by Chairman Schapiro, the Commission plans
to:
(1) Conduct a thorough inquiry into the practical and legal obsta-
cles that U.S. firms encountered in transferring positions and funds
held through [Barings Securities];
(2) Determine the extent to which existing CFTC and U.S. mar-
ket operational, legal and regulatory systems sufficiently address
such obstacles;
(3) Assess what further measures can be undertaken to enhance
the safety of customer funds; and
(4) Work with SIMEX, the CME and other linked markets to as-
sure that market linkages do not diminish existing market and fi-
nancial protections.65
Second, in a joint initiative with the U.K. Securities and Investments
Board, the Commission has organized a meeting, in May 1995 in
London, among futures market regulators and exchange officials from
twelve countries, representing the world's major financial markets."
Building upon existing international relationships, this group will de-
velop an agenda of market and customer protection initiatives that
will:
[1] Enhance communication among international regulators and
market authorities during [any future] financial crisis;
[2] Identify [the] legal and practical impediments to containing
the spillover effects of financial disruptions at specific firms or in
specific markets;
[3] Foster protection of customer funds wherever located...;
[4] Promote national bankruptcy laws that [will] forestall liquidity
crises by not freezing the margins and positions of solvent custom-
ers within insolvent firms; and
64. Schapiro, supra note 51, at 4-5.
65. I& at 10.
66. See id.
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[5] Improve mechanisms for detecting and addressing concentra-
tions of positions held in multiple markets that threaten the finan-
cial integrity of th[ose] markets.67
The Barings crisis was a painful episode for the world's financial
markets. It provided exchanges, traders, and regulators alike with
many anxious moments. If we take to heart, however, the lessons this
episode can teach us, we can, I hope, create a marketplace and a regu-
latory system better prepared to withstand whatever unknown shocks
the future may hold.
In that regard, let me add one final thought. Many of the post-
Barings reforms currently being considered by the regulatory commu-
nity may entail increased administrative burdens for firms and their
customers, as well as potentially higher transactions costs. As a conse-
quence, I doubt that many of these proposed reforms will be imple-
mented unless the industry itself, both firms and end-users, weigh
heavily into the debate. Foreign exchanges and their regulators need
to hear whether vigorous market surveillance and protection of cus-
tomer funds are important issues to those who use their markets-
important enough that they might take their business elsewhere if
such safeguards are not up to par.
67. Id. at 11.
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